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Abstract
N a rra tive  theo logy: An a d e q u a te  parad igm  for 
theological reflection?
As reflection on the religious claims em bedded in 
s to rie s , n arra tiv e  theology touches the nerve of 
theology: what is the epistemological status of theo­
logical theories if they are based on discourse which is 
fundamentally narrative and metaphorical? This paper 
analyzes this question, along with the important dif­
ferences between ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ narrative theo­
logy. Crucial problems arise from this and are discus­
sed: the epistemological problem of determining crite­
ria for assessing the truth claims of theological state­
ments; and the hermeneutical criteria for distinguishing 
betw een good and bad receptions of Christianity’s 
classic text.
In his recent seminal article entitled ‘Two types of narrative theology’, Gary L 
Comstock (1987a: 687) defines narrative theology as a reflection on the religious 
claims embedded in stories and regards this significant approach to theology as one 
of the most viable and important alternatives for doing theology today.
As a paradigm for postmodern theology, narrative theology grows directly from 
the deep conviction that temporal narrativity constitutes the substance of personal 
human identity: as such it is aimed at the ultimate interpretation of the ‘story of our 
lives’. This basic narrative condition of what it means to be human, can also be 
described as the ontological condition for human stories of any kind: without it
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there could be no literature, no history, no philosophy and certainly no religion (cf 
Brockelman 1988: 2). Narrative theology takes this basic narrativity seriously in 
order to think through the nature of specifically religious knowledge.
Taking into account important German and British contributions, narrative 
theology still might be regarded as mainly an American contribution to postmodern 
anti-foundational theological thought. The historical starting point of narrative 
theology could most likely be linked to H Richard Niebuhr’s (1941) essay entitled 
‘The story of our lives’ (cf Comstock 1987b: 125). It is, however, especially since the 
1970’s that this them e has become increasingly dom inant. Today prominent 
although diverse theologians are associated with narrative theology: Paul Ricoeur, 
Hans Frei, David Tracy, George Lindbeck, Stanley Hauerwas, Sallie McFague, 
Johann Baptist Metz, Michael Goldberg, James H Cone, Ronald F Thiemann, 
Carol Christ, David Burrell, Harvey Cox and James McClendon, to mention but a 
few.
Despite the rapid growth of narrative theology it would appear that a definite 
tension has set in, dividing narrative theologians into two distinct groups, each with 
a more or less definable set of theological presuppositions and methodology.
For the sake of analysis these two groups of narrative theologians can be 
identified as pure narrativists and impure narrativists (cf Comstock 1987a: 688 ff). 
Pure narrativ ists can be described as anti-foundational, cultural-linguistic, 
W ittgensteinian-inspired descriptivists. For theologians like Frei, Lindbeck, 
Hauerwas and David Kelsey narrative as an autonomous literary form is particularly 
suited to theological reflection. N arrative here has a special status in the 
construction of theological statements, while abstract reasoning and philosophical 
categories do not belong to the essential task of what it means to do theology. 
Christian faith here is best understood by grasping the grammatical rules and 
concepts of its texts and practices.
Impure narrative theologians, on the other hand find their inspiration in the 
circle of revisionist, hermeneutical, Gadamerian-inspired correlationists (Comstock 
1987a: 688). Theologians like Tracy, McFague and Ricoeur, while agreeing with 
‘pure narrativists’ about the central role of narrative in the communication of the 
Christian story, deny it any exclusive autonomous theological function in theological 
theorizing. For them narrative exhibits philosophical, historical and psychological 
claims, and these need to be examined with the m ethods of those particular 
disciplines. In addition, pure narrative theologians very consciously construct a 
postmodern paradigm for theology, while impure narrativists creatively revise the 
paradigms of language, reason and practice of the liberal tradition in diverse 
attempts to justify the cognitive claims of theological reflection.
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The explicit tension in the ranks of narrative theology is already implicit in the 
work of H Richard Niebuhr, who - as ‘father’ of contemporary narrative theology - 
made an important and far reaching distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
history. Gary Comstock (1987b) supplies us with an illuminating analysis of this 
distinction: internal history has to do with the self-description of the Christian 
community in terms of their present experiences of the divine revelation; external 
history, on the other hand, is past history understood from the perspective of the 
observer - ‘objective’ history which could as such be subjected to the queries of 
scientific investigation.
For Niebuhr the very real tension between these two types of history had to be 
maintained: Christians must begin with their own present experiences of Christ, but 
should not isolate this from the criticism and correction of ‘external’ or scientific 
history. For Niebuhr Christians had to tell both stories, the internal history of our 
experiences with Christ as well as the external story of our experience with nature, 
history and science. Gary Comstock correctly states that present-day narrativists 
have been unable to tell ‘the whole story’ by opting for either internal or external 
history, giving rise to a new and improper tension between ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ 
narrativists (Comstock 1987b: 143 0- A way out of this impasse might be to find a 
way to reinterpret Christianity so as to be faithful to the biblical narratives, while at 
the same time remaining open to the philosophical and hermeneutical claims that 
result from the interpretation and explanation of these narratives.
W ithin the family of narrative theologians th ree  com mon fea tu res or 
resemblances are shared, namely, description, explanation and justification. When, 
however, one examines the different ways in which narrativists decribe, explain and 
justify the Christian story, serious differences between the so-called pure and impure 
narrative theologians appear (cf Comstock 1987a: 690 ff). All narrativists agree that 
acceptable description should be conducted in terms of Scripture’s own narratives 
and autobiographies and not in categories alien to the Biblical stories. An adequate 
explanation of the Christian story should be arrived at in terms of the internal rules 
and procedures of the Bible’s own language game, and not in terms of imported 
philosophical theories or social-scientific laws. Justification of Christianity should 
take the form of pragmatic demonstration that this tradition entails a liberating and 
authentic form of life: a form of life and thought that does not need justification by 
means of philosophical criteria for rationality and logic (cf Pieterse 1989: 2 f).
It is, however, precisely on this point that serious differences between pure and 
impure narrativists appear: while, for example, purists do not reject critical thinking, 
they are wary of speculative reason and any a ttem p t at a foundationalist 
epistemology. Because theology is fundamentally descriptive and regulative, it
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should not step outside the boundaries of the confessing community as the biblical 
narrative determines what can be said and done in theology. While purists have 
little or no room for the apologetic task of theology, ‘impure’ narrativists like David 
Tracy - while not discounting the centrality and power of the biblical narratives - 
nevertheless deny absolute independence to narra tive as such and argue that 
narratives contain all kinds of historical, psychological and metaphysical claims and 
therefore invite the critical inquiry of historians, feminists and philosophers.
A second deep rift between purists and impurists appear on the level of 
explanation. For a purist like George Lindbeck the Christian story posits a kind of 
language game sui generis, having its own unique procedures and rules. In this 
model doctrines are regulative rules for a confessing community and as such make 
no factual or ontological claims. While for this purist position it would be improper 
to explain the Christian story in terms of some other language game, for impure 
narrativists the Christian language game is in continual public conversation with 
other language games and should therefore be critically correlated with the insights 
of contemporary philosophers, ethicists and social scientists.
A third point of contention between purists and impurists centers around the 
justification of the Christian story. Pure narrative theologians want to bring 
theology to a com plete halt once it has narratively described (and therefore 
explained) Christianity. Justification of the truth claims of the Christian faith is 
therefore of a pragmatic nature. On this impurists obviously disagree: according to 
them the truth claims of Christianity demand metaphysical inquiry in order to 
determine whether Christian beliefs are rationally acceptable, and whether there 
are ontological and/or epistemological grounds on which they can be justified (cf 
Comstock 1987a: 703 ff).
These important differences between pure and impure narrative theology at this 
stage already highlights two central problems for any contemporary theology:
* the epistemological problem of determining criteria for assessing the truth 
claims and cognitive status of theological statements;
* hermeneutical criteria for distinguishing between good or bad receptions of 
Christianity’s classic text, and thus for assessing the validity of different 
interpretations of this text.
As reflection on the religious claims embedded in stories, narrative theology indeed 
touches the nerve of theology: what is the epistemological status of theological 
theories if they are based on discourse which is fundamentally narrative and 
m etaphorical? With this in mind it is im portant to realize that in our age
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postmodern thought has highlighted the limits of human knowledge as well as a new 
understand ing of the paradigm atic value of truth (cf Glanville 1989: 3). It is 
therefore perfectly understandable that a ‘pure’ narrativist like Ronald Thiemann 
can caution theology not to formulate a specific theory for understanding faith, 
because all such theories obscure both the diversity and the mystery of human 
response to the gospel: to acknowledge the biblical narrative as God’s promise is to 
believe that the crucified Jesus lives (Thiem ann 1987a: 38). In this sense a 
postm odern  ‘pure’ n a rra tive theology can even be seen as a call for a ‘new 
Reformation’: a new reformation to free Scripture once again, but this time from 
the papacy of the scholar (cf Wiles 1987: 44).
This specific kind of postmodern viewpoint, I have argued elsewhere (V an 
H uyssteen 1988: 12), eventually reduces theological reflection to a form of 
Wittgensteinian fideism while at the same time abandoning all truth claims as well 
as any plausible notion of explanatory progress for theological reflection. The 
hermeneutical and epistemological problems created by the divergent trends in 
contemporary narrative theology is especially highlighted by Thiemann’s ‘pure’ form 
of narrative theology when the irrational inclusion of God as the hard core of a 
theological paradigm reveals a retreat to an esoteric commitment which firmly bars 
the way of theology to the reality about which it proposes to make statements. This 
is especially prominent in Thiemann’s recent work (1987b) where he argues that the 
category of ‘narrated promise’ offers a non-foundational way of reconceptualizing 
Christian theology. This model for doing narra tive theology becomes extra 
problematic when Thiemann contrasts narrative theology as descriptive theology 
with all forms of explanation, which for him always implies a foundationalist 
epistemology.
To counter this problem it is important to realize that biblical narratives are 
already interpretations, and biblical concepts in themselves are mini-theories that 
reveal the way in which the classic text of the Bible was received and interpreted 
through the ages.
The biblical narratives as we have them are therefore already interpretations, 
already seen through the eyes of faith. In this sense Janet Martin Soskice can 
correctly state: to narrate is to explain (Soskice 1988: 130). With this statement 
Soskice rightly exposes the fine division between narrative and discursive forms of 
theology as a naive and even potentially dangerous illusion (cf Jeanrond 1988: 158). 
Although narrative is an essential genre for communicating the Christian gospel, no 
form of ‘pure narrative theology’ will be able to solve the epistemological problems 
of contemporary theology. A non-foundationalist ‘pure’ narrative theology with its 
concern for a descriptive justification in ternal to the C hristian  framework,
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eventually reveals a peculiar brand of new-Wittgensteinian fideism. On this view 
religious beliefs have no need for explanatory support and in the end can hardly be 
seen as more than a groundless language game. In fact, these kind of beliefs 
become a species of belief whose truth is discovered by means of criteria internal to 
the language game itself (cf Steuer 1987: 241). The consequences of a so-called 
‘pure’ narrative theology therefore becomes clear: Pure narrative theology not only 
leads to a relativistic understanding of justification, truth and knowledge, but also to 
an epistemological relativism which would be fatal for the cognitive claims of 
theological statements.
It is, however, of great importance to realize that the rationality of Christian 
theology is distinctively shaped by the fact that myths and metaphor are intrinsic to 
our knowing and naming of God, and that narrative is the very essence of the 
Christian faith. This essential narrativity of the Christian faith, as we have seen, 
does have a special appeal for postmodern theological reflection.
Any discussion of the merits of either ‘pure’ or ‘impure’ narrative theology will 
therefore have to include a careful analysis of what is meant by ‘postmodern’ as 
opposed to ‘m odern’. An analysis of the postmodern mentality as opposed to 
modernity is important not only because the rift within the family of narrative 
theologians can be largely reduced to this important conceptual problem, but also 
because it directly addresses the problem  of fideism and foundationalism  in 
contem porary theology. An analysis of these epistem ological problem s will 
eventually lead to an analysis of the hermeneutical problems implicit in all overt 
contextual theological models.
Futhermore: if postmodernism really is a departure from modernism and not 
merely a reaction to it, it could mean that the epistemological and hermeneutical 
p roblem s connected with a m odern paradigm  are at best irrelevant to the 
postm odern approach (cf Pieterse 1989: 5). This could mean that the so-called 
‘resemblances’ identified by Gary Comstock between pure and impure narrative 
theology - namely description, explanation and justification - could well designate a 
far greater incommensurability between the two approaches to doing theology than 
initially conceived.
Narrative theology - in all its ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ forms - can in the end only be 
fully u n d ersto o d  w ithin the b ro ad e r fram ew ork of postm odern  thought. 
Postmodernism itself is more of an attitude than a specific demonstrable trend or 
paradigm (cf Du Toit 1989). Typical of postmodernism is its scepticism concerning 
the central role assigned to reason and rational thought. Over against indubitable 
truth claims, an over confident faith in science and a metaphysical way of reasoning, 
the interrelatedness of truth-perspectives, ethical pluralism and cultural relativism is
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typical of the postmodern perspective.
Over against a literal and empirical understanding of knowledge and truth, 
postmodernism emphasizes the linguistic dimension of human nature, as well as the 
deep conviction that temporal narrativity constitutes the substance of what it means 
to be human. Within this postmodern framework literal language is replaced by an 
awareness of the metaphoricity and relationality of all language, but especially of 
religious language. Religious narrative thus seeks to make life’s u ltim ate 
hermeneutical goal known: through narrative past events become ‘graspable’ and 
creates an awareness of a transcendental reality ‘beyond’ this world (cf Glanville 
1989: 5). It is through myth and metaphor that this ‘beyond’ is actualized in our 
experience and understanding. Religious narrative leads us to see ‘through the 
window’ of metaphor, to the way we ought to believe. Epistemic access through 
metaphor is therefore neither empirically deductive, nor literally true, nor subjective 
illusion.
For this reason Janet Martin Soskice, in answer to the question “what would the 
epistemological status of theological concepts be if they were not based on a 
discourse which is fundamentally narrative and metaphorical?’, can correctly claim: 
whatever they would be, they would not be Christian (cf Soskice 1988: 131).
For the same reason a pure narrative theology that consciously brackets the 
ques tion  of tru th  and valid ity , can only be seen as a kind of sec ta rian  
instrumentalism: a narrative theology which achieves a meaningful Christian story at 
the cost of detaching this story from any dialogue with other Christians and with the 
secular world.
When the problem of the justification of the cognitive claims of theological 
statements are considered, the central role of metaphor now becomes crucial. The 
reason why it becomes so important to single out the role of metaphorical language 
in religious texts is precisely because of the function of these metaphors. Metaphors 
certainly do not function only to ‘name’ something: on the contrary, they provide 
epistemic access to that which is being referred to. As such they function to catch 
great strands of association, conscious and perhaps unconscious, for readers of a 
certain religious tradition (cf Soskice 1988: 134). This does not mean that what 
metaphor gives epistemic access to and ‘catches’ as meaningful, is not real: what the 
m etaphor catches or opens up is closely connected to the overall narrative 
construction of the texts involved.
In this sense theology basically reflects on religious experience and the ensuing 
religious language as ways to the reality we call God. But these experiences, and 
their accompanying metaphorical language, can only be reliably interpreted on the 
basis of the classic texts of the Christian faith. In this sense the text of the Bible, as
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the u ltim ate ‘way‘ to the reality that is God, in itself becomes a reality that 
epistemologically functions as a very exclusive access to the reality of God. To this I 
have previously referred as the realism of the text (Van Huyssteen 1987: 30).
Within the context of this biblical text, narrative can be seen as a particular kind 
of textual structure characterized by its sequential, story-like qualities (cf Soskice 
1988: 135). From this logically flows that not all biblical genres can be regarded as 
narrative, and certainly not all biblical metaphors are parts of narrative structures. 
This eventually will imply that theological reflection can never be exclusively 
defined in terms of only one biblical genre, however important it may be.
Narratives, as first o rder accounts, histories or stories, in a sense is even 
opposed to theology as a second order reflection on the classic texts and Christian 
experience. The popularity of a narrative theology - especially a ‘pure’ form of 
narrative theology - certainly is also concerned with reconfirming the place of the 
Bible in Christian life and thought. But, as Janet Martin Soskice has recently 
pointed out: one reason for the popularity of the narrative theology paradigm is that 
it effectively brackets the question of truth (Soskice 1988: 139). This obviously also 
is the reason why many postmodern theologians feel comfortable with the narrative 
theology paradigm: both accurate historical reports as well as pure fiction can be 
narratives, and epistemological truth claims - however provisional - are sacrificed to 
the suprem acy of n arra tiv e  m eaning. And when in this way a narra tive  
interpretation becomes a narrative theology, at least a few epistemological eyebrows 
should be raised (cf Soskice 1988: 139), because narrative in this mode is a retreat 
into the ghetto of a world created rather than illuminated by the scriptural text (cf 
Wiles 1987: 49).
Narrative, then, although an essential genre for communicating the Christian 
faith, by itself will not solve the epistem ological problem of the shaping of 
rationality in contemporary theology.
A pure narrative theology that brackets the problem of the justification of the 
cognitive claims of theological statements, in the end ignores the question of truth 
and the problem of the shaping of rationality in theological reflection. It also 
bypasses the problem of reference or reality depiction, as ‘pure’ narrativists see the 
problem of justification in religious faith as entirely an internal, pragmatic matter. 
The cognitive claims of the Christian faith should be justified not only by their 
pragmatic effect and transformative power, but also by other epistemic values like 
reality depiction, contextuality, problemsolving and explanatory progress. A 
theology that takes these implicit philosophical and epistemological claims seriously, 
could well be called an ‘im pure narrative theology’. From a contem porary 
philosophy of science point of view, a weak form of critical realism can provide
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epistemic warrants for the rationality of such an ‘impure’ narrative theology: an anti- 
fideist and non-foundational theology that still has a valid place within the 
postmodern paradigm. Such a theology not only takes the problem of the shaping 
of theological rationality seriously: it also takes seriously the inescapable relation of 
theology to religious experience, to metaphor and to story.
Against this background it would be rather naive to think that narrative as a 
biblical genre is precritical, pre-interpretative and thus always preferable to 
interpretation, justification and argumentation (cf Jeanrond 1988: 151). All forms 
of theological communication contain interpretative elements, take sides, reveal 
particular perspectives and therefore needs critical assessment.
It now also seems that the question of an adequate theory of reference in 
theological theory formation must remain on the agenda of all forms of narrative 
theology.
Our discussion has shown that even in a postmodern paradigm it seems to be 
impossible to bracket the epistemological problems of validity, credibility and 
truthfulness when dealing with religious narratives. For this reason systematic 
theology will have to deal responsibly with a valid theory of metaphorical reference 
as a logical result of the basic realist assumptions and commitments of Christian 
theology.
With this in mind it becomes doubtful whether Gary Comstock’s assertion that 
the Jewish theologian Max Kadushin’s system of value-concepts does in fact provide 
an answer to the present dispute between pure and impure narrativists (Comstock 
1989), can be regarded as epistemologically convincing. Kadushin analizes the 
interpretative role of value-concepts or control beliefs that provide us with a picture 
of the text-reader relationship. Value-concepts from the Torah, like charity, 
kingship, holiness and prayer cannot be pinned down by objective description but 
nevertheless have great pragmatic weight. These value-concepts guide behaviour 
and express the self-identity of successive generations of God’s people. Comstock 
uses this approach as a resource for understanding Christian narrative and its appeal 
to the quality of one’s entire life before God. It is, however, not clear how 
Comstock hopes to transcend the pragmatic criterion of pure narrative theology by 
appealing to value concepts when interpreting central Christian narratives. I am not 
convinced that he has succeeded in resolving the epistemological and hermeneutical 
problems referred to above.
In conclusion: the realist choice implied by a non-foundational impure narrative 
theology is justified only by uncovering the basis of Christian narrative in history.
It has already become clear that the only way we can manage to say anything 
about God at all is through our extended concepts, that is through analogies and
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metaphors. The important and final question that now arises, is: do we have good 
enough reasons to believe that these extended concepts are managing to do what we 
think they are doing, that is managing to refer, to ‘get hold of reality?’
To ask this is to ask for adequate epistemological reasons for a weak form of 
critical realism in theology. I have suggested (Van Huyssteen 1987: 31) that the 
following could count toward a critical realist theory of metaphorical reference in 
Christian theology:
* The fact that the Bible, as the classic text of the Christian faith, has survived as a 
religious text and as a book of faith in a long and remarkable interpretative 
tradition of a still ongoing faith-context;
* The rea lity of ongoing faith experiences that this text has evoked through 
centuries of belief in God.
* The metaphorical nature of biblical language and the continuity of reference 
this has creatively given to religious and theological language through the ages. 
This presupposes a continuous language-using community going back to the 
‘initiating events’ when these metaphorical terms were first introduced and their 
reference fixed.
I think one could safely say that the very reason narrative achieved such p re­
eminence in Christianity is because of this religion’s concern to show that God acts 
in the human world and its history: narrative becomes important for Christians and 
for Christian readings of the Old Testament because of the life of Jesus. In this 
sense one can rightfully claim: all forms of narrative theology grows from 
Christology (cf Soskice 1988: 150). Epistemologically then, this realist choice and 
the fixing of metaphorical reference is justified by uncovering the basis of Christian 
narrative in history.
And as to the events in the life and death of Jesus: one can only generalise from 
parable to myth and from myth to fiction if it can be shown that historical questions 
are irrelevant to a full and proper religious understanding of the gospel narratives.
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